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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this dissertation is to add to the understanding of budgetary
processes and changes in public organizations. Work in this field has relied upon
the theory of incrementalism and punctuated equilibrium theory as explanations of
the budgetary process. In short, these theories state that budgetary changes will be
mostly small (incremental), but also subject to overly large changes (punctuations).
Categorizations and conceptualizations of incremental and punctuated changes
have varied much through the literature. This has led to much confusion over what
is and is not incrementalism in budgetary studies. After a review of all the ways
in which budgetary changes are characterized and measured throughout scholarly
work, this dissertation contributes to the literature by describing four unique types
of incrementalism that scholars have utilized in their work. It is the hope that scholars
can adopt these terminologies to better communicate how they are conceptualizing
incrementalism.
Leading explanations for incremental and punctuated patterns of change revolve
around cognitive limitations and institutional friction–the organizational structure
of decision-making. To advance the literature, this dissertation draws from pub-
lic administration literature and theorizes about “non-institutional friction” that
influences budgetary changes. Non-institutional frictions are factors aside from in-
stitutional structure than can affect budgetary decision-making. Furthermore, this
dissertation extends punctuated equilibrium work to examine the consequences of
punctuations and incremental changes on public organization performance.
Using data from hundreds of public organizations (Texas school districts) for over
a fifteen year period, this dissertation finds support for non-institutional friction. In
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addition, results indicate that managers are able to keep relatively stable performance
despite rapid (positive and negative) budgetary changes.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Public budgeting is at the heart of governments and organizations. The process of
obtaining, allocating, and spending money for public goods and services is wrapped
with many difficult choices. There are finite financial resources available and many
groups fight for a larger portion of funds. Those who can influence government
officials and managers for discretionary funds have power in society. In a similar
vein, the ability of governments to modify program budgets to meet desired policy
levels is another key function of governments and organizations. There must exist
a balance between stability and flexibility for organizations to succeed and adapt to
changing demands.
There have been decades of research to develop a theory of the budgeting process.
One strand of budgetary research examines how allocations change over time and
what influences those alterations. The leading theory of the budgetary process is
incrementalism. It has been supported broadly throughout budgetary research. Em-
bracing incrementalism while also accounting for large policy changes, punctuated
equilibrium theory (PET) has also found a home in budgetary studies. PET has
been robustly supported in many contexts 1.
This dissertation expands both theoretical and empirical work in PET. Starting
at the foundation, this dissertation reviews the many ways increment and punctu-
ated changes has been conceptualized and measured throughout the literature. A
synthesis of the measurement of budgetary changes provides a common language and
background for scholars to better communicate incrementalism in their own work.
1A more through literature review of incrementalism and PET is given in later sections.
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This literature has moved beyond identifying distributional patterns in budgetary
processes to examining those factors that cause more or less punctuations. Leading
explanations acknowledge both cognitive limitations and institutional structures that
slow down the decision-making process. This dissertation contributes to the liter-
ature by showing how features of the organization, besides institutional structures,
influence budgetary changes. Particularly, scholarship from public administration is
applied to explain other sources of friction in organizations.
This dissertation also contributes to PET by analyzing the consequences of all
sizes of budgetary changes on organizational performance. Thus far, the literature
has examined what influences punctuations, but not what punctuations do to the
ability of organizations to maintain their work. Understanding how the pattern of
policy changes identified in PET translates to performance outcomes shows how
organizations and governments can maintain work despite large budgetary changes.
Before individual section descriptions, a brief review of PET is necessary.
1.2 Punctuated Equilibrium Theory
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) incorporates incrementalism, but also
accounts for overly large punctuated changes that occur in budgetary changes. The
theory predicts that the distribution of policy changes (in the present dissertation,
measured through budgets) will have mostly small changes located in the central
part of the distribution and many large, punctuated changes in the tails of the
distribution. Baumgartner and Jones (2009) borrowed this theory from the physical
sciences that describe earthquakes and landslides. In short, this theory states that
small changes will build up demand and pressure within a system that will eventually
give way as a massive change.
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The literature has demonstrated the presence of incremental and punctuated
changes in many contexts from local, state, and federal governments, and agencies.
It has been robustly demonstrated that this pattern of budgetary changes exists in
many different contexts (Jones et. al 2009). The literature is now progressing to
identify what factors cause more or less stability in budgetary processes.
1.2.1 Reasons for PET
Literature has identified two major reasons for punctuations–disproportionate
information processing and institutional friction. The first reason, disproportionate
information processing, is grounded in bounded rationality. Government officials
and managers simply cannot analyze all signals and demands in the environment;
they can only comprehend a few key issues at one time. This leads to over-reaction
to problems when they get the policy attention to under-reacting or ignoring issues
when they are out of mind. Taken together, this is what is theorized to lead to the
pattern of overly large and incremental changes.
The second theoretical reason for punctuations is institutional friction. In short,
this theory states that the process of translating policy inputs to outputs can have
repercussions on policy changes. The more veto points or decision clearances, the
more friction in the policy system. This friction leads to more punctuations than
expected by a normal distribution 2.
These explanations, though, do not account for the time series aspect of pre-
dicting punctuations. This is studied by Robinson, Flink, and King (Forthcoming).
PET suggests that punctuations occur to relieve pressure within the policy system.
Large changes are brought about to correct for neglected problems and bring desired
and actual policy levels into equilibrium. This hypothesis–called the Institutional
2Later sections will give more details for this literature review.
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Model by Robinson, Flink, and King (Forthcoming)–suggests that the probability
of having a punctuation is negatively related to having had one in the recent past.
However, another model posited by Robinson, Flink, and King (Forthcoming)–the
Error Accumulation Model–suggests that the probability of experiencing a punctua-
tion is positively related to having experienced one in the recent past. Organizational
chaos and mismanagement lead to numerous budgetary fluctuations in a short time
span. Empirical results support the Error Accumulation Model. Punctuations occur
in clusters.
1.2.2 Methods for Testing PET
Empirical methods have centered on univariate tests assessing the normality of
the distribution of budgetary changes. The main test was determining the kurtosis
value of the distribution. While this can determine the proportion of incremental to
punctuated changes and compare it to a normal distribution, the methods could not
account for competing explanations of budgetary changes.
In addition to improving the theoretical understandings of why punctuations
occur, the literature is also working to advanced the empirical methodology used
to test these theories. One important progression has been the use of multivariate
hypothesis testing. This has been done by categorizing the distribution of budgetary
changes by size–punctuated, incremental, and medium size changes. The categories
are then used as the dependent variable in either logit or multinomial logit models,
depending on how many distinct groups the variable was split into.
1.2.3 Setting–Texas School Districts
The data used in this dissertation are from Texas School Districts. This data set
contains budgetary, performance, personnel, student, management, and organiza-
tional information on over a thousand school districts in Texas for an almost 20 year
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period. This education data is theoretically a good setting for this dissertation given
that these organizations have similar goals, policy and regulatory environments, and
funding structures (mostly from state and local sources). While the districts are
similar in their broader goals and environment, Texas school districts have a lot of
variation in other aspects. District enrollment, organization centralization, standard-
ize test performance, racial diversity, teacher experience, and budgetary choices (to
just name a few) all vary within this context.
A major component to this dissertation is that management and decision-makers
in the organization are able to control their budgets. In Texas, each district has some
level of discretion over their budgeting decision. Typically, budgetary decisions are
made by the superintendent and school board of a district. Depending on how large
and professionalized the school district is, members of the central administration
staff may assist in the budgetary process. Overall, though, the budgetary process
in this setting is a top-down structure. These similarities become key in choosing
appropriate budgetary, performance, and institutional structure measures that are
common across all organizations for empirical analyses.
Empirically, this large data set provides a good testing ground for this disser-
tation. Budgetary punctuations are rare events. To observe many punctuations, a
large data set is needed. This data set provides over 18,500 cases–enough to examine
many punctuations.
1.3 Section Overview
The subsections below outline and motivate the empirical sections of this disser-
tation.
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1.3.1 Section Two: Conceptualizations and Measurement of Budgetary Change
Incrementalism is heavily critiqued for its breadth and lack of depth–it has been
applied in many ways by scholars in academic research. Conceptually, it has many
definitions. It is also criticized because it only accounts for small changes. Incre-
mentalism does not offer a theoretical explanation for medium and large budgetary
changes. However, even with these shortcomings, the theory could not be wholly
dismissed given that budgets do have mostly small changes over time.
Through the decades of budgetary work, there have been numerous ways in which
incrementalism has been characterized and evaluated. To give just a few examples,
incrementalism has been used as a descriptive theory and predictive theory. It has
also referred to institutional structures, procedures, and budgetary outcomes. This
has been further complicated with the advent of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory
(PET) that considers not just incremental changes, but large punctuated changes.
Conceptualizations then extended to explaining overly large changes and not just
small and “not small” changes.
In addition to the numerous conceptualizations of incrementalism and punctu-
ations, there has also been many different ways in which it has been empirically
measured–even within each conceptualization. Many of these measures categorize
budgetary changes based on their size–incremental and non-incremental. This stems
from theory that examines incremental, non-incremental, and punctuated changes.
However, this approach has a few drawbacks. One limitation of this categorization
is that it masks the variation needed to advance the study of budgetary changes. In
addition, this two part categorization combines positive and negative changes. This
hinders the theoretical development of understanding what leads to and what is the
impact of positive and negative changes. Other categorization schemes have divided
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budgetary changes into five categories–negative punctuation, negative medium, in-
cremental, positive medium, and positive punctuation. This preserves more of the
variation and separates positive and negative changes.
With all of these unique meanings and measures, it increases the difficulty of
scholars to advance the field. As budgetary and PET literatures progress in empiri-
cal work, it is essential that scholars review the conceptualizations and measurement
of incremental and punctuated changes. Section 2 of this dissertation will synthesize
the literature and develop four typologies of incrementalism. Although scholars will
never agree on one common conceptualization or measurement scheme, it is neces-
sary to have a common core understanding of the ways in which we characterize
incrementalism and punctuations and its consequences for research.
1.3.2 Section Three: Other Sources of Friction to Influence Budgetary
Punctuations
To explain budgetary changes, PET has relied on institutional and cognitive fac-
tors to explain how friction in the organization leads to punctuations. Of course, this
was the original intent of Baumgartner and Jones–to examine how institutional struc-
tures shape policy changes. This work has produced robust findings that institutional
friction yields leptokurtic distributions. However, there are other components of or-
ganizations, aside from its structure, that influence the potential for policy stability.
Public administration literature argues that managers, workers, performance, and
other environmental factors have direct impacts on stress within the organization.
Section 3 in this dissertation takes two basic variables from public administration
literature–organization performance and personnel stability–to examine how they
affect budgetary changes in the organization. Drawing from Texas school districts,
the dependent variable (budgetary changes) will be measured by the annual percent-
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age change in instructional spending per student. This budget represents the core
function of the organization–educating students. Typical to public administration
studies that use education data, organizational performance will be measure by the
district percent student pass rate of the standardized test. Personnel stability will
be measured by the percent annual teacher turnover.
By bringing public administration to PET, a better understanding can be gained
on how organization features, besides the institutional structure, can influence stabil-
ity. Even with a stable structure in the organization, an unstable workforce or poor
performance (examined in this study) can create stress within the institution that
can yield volatile policy outcomes. Failing public organizations are likely to grab
the attention of citizens and policy makers. In turn, they are likely to experience
large policy changes to try to jolt the organization to improve. Organizations that
are succeeding will not have the same pressure to change their work since they are
already doing well. For personnel, high turnover can signal dissatisfaction among
employees and stress in the organization. This results in large policy changes.
1.3.3 Section Four: Extending PET–Consequences of Budgetary Changes on
Performance
The budgetary and PET literatures have considered budgets as outputs. How-
ever, they are also inputs that influence how well the organization performs. How
financial resources influence organization outputs and outcomes has been examined
in both public administration and political science literatures. A lot of this work has
examined how budget cuts influence agency performance. It has produced mixed
results. While some scholars contend the actual dollar amount impacts work, other
scholars find the signal sent to organizations by cutting funds actually decreases
work.
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In the public administration context, managers are expected to take any size
budgetary input and maintain or improve performance. One of their key tasks is
creating stable outcomes from unstable inputs. Punctuated equilibrium literature has
not yet considered how the leptokurtic distributions translate in the implementation
phase to outcomes. Section 4 of this dissertation examines this question–how can
managers “order chaos” from budgetary changes to performance stability?
The dependent variable for empirical analyses in this section is the annual per-
centage change in the standardized test pass rate for a district. The main indepen-
dent variables are dummy variables for the categories of budgetary changes (with
incremental changes as the base category). Other factors that are known to influ-
ence performance are included as controls in the model. However, these are factors
known to influence the absolute level of performance–not necessarily the change in
performance.
1.4 Conclusion
Every government, institution, and organization has to work with budgets. This
dissertation adds to the understanding of the conceptualizations, measurement, causes,
and consequences of budgetary changes. The goal of this dissertation is to increase
the knowledge of the budgetary process by drawing from political science and public
administration literatures. It can help inform public agencies when to expect stable
and volatile budgetary environments.
Scholars have successfully demonstrated how institutional structures influence the
policy making process. This has led to a better understanding of how organizations
maintain stability and on the other side, remain in fluctuation. However, institutions
may have similar structures but experience different issues that must be addressed
within the organization. Each year, managers face unique problems in their organi-
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zation. These issues must influence budgetary decisions within the organization. In
this dissertation, I aim to explain how non-institutional factors of concern to all pub-
lic organizations–performance and personnel turnover–impact budgetary changes, as
well as, the consequences of those budgetary changes on the organization.
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2. THE UNSTABLE USE OF STABILITY–CONCEPTUALIZATIONS AND
MEASUREMENTS OF INCREMENTAL AND PUNCTUATED CHANGES
2.1 The Unstable Use of “Stability”
The literature on incrementalism has become a “muddled” mess. Quite iron-
ically, one common definition of incremental is “regular” or “stable” (Dempster and
Wildavsky 1979) though its meaning has been anything but regular or stable. Schol-
ars have defined and redefined “incremental” to fit a variety of research needs. It has
been used as a normative, descriptive, explanatory, and predictive theory throughout
the literature (Berry 1990; Tucker 1982; Wanat 1974). As such, there are numer-
ous working definitions that have caused the study of incrementalism to expand in
breadth rather than in depth. To name a few, incrementalism has been defined as a
method of problem solving, a process of interaction, a theory of organizational behav-
ior, a theory of policy development, a shift in organizational relationships, and the
size of monetary change (Berry 1990; Dempster and Wildavsky 1979). Berry (1990)
condenses these to three general definitions of incrementalism: simple decision rules,
regularity of relationships, and lack of effect of external variables.
Since incrementalism has come to describe so many diverse actions and outcomes,
Berry (1990) believes it has lost a true meaning and recommended that the term be
dropped completely from future works. While the term is not likely to leave academic
research because it is the foundation of budgetary studies, it is necessary to review
and refine its definition and use in scholarly work.
Coupled with its broad definitions, the measurement and operationalization of
incrementalism have varied widely in the literature (Berry 1990). Likewise, the mea-
surement of non-incremental changes has varied as well. Categorization was further
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complicated with the advent of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (Baumgartner and
Jones 2010) which emphasized the study of large, dramatic changes known as punc-
tuations. The “punctuations” category described extreme non-incremental changes.
Their measurement has also varied. These inconsistencies will be explained in detail
in this section.
The incremental and punctuated equilibrium literature is transitioning from sim-
ply identifying that these processes exist in a variety of budget contexts to exam-
ining the political and administrative factors that contribute to the stability and
volatility in the budgetary environment. In conjunction, the empirical methods in
the literature are advancing from univariate tests to multivariate hypothesis test-
ing. Univariate tests of incrementalism and punctuated equilibrium theory revolve
around checking the normality and kurtosis of the distribution of budgetary changes
(Jordan 2003; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen 2003; Mortensen
2005; Robinson 2004; John and Margetts 2003; Breunig and Koski 2006; Breunig
2006; Baumgartner, Foucault, and Franc¸ois 2006). When a distribution of budgetary
changes has a statistically significant level of kurtosis, punctuated equilibrium theory
is said to be supported. These methods, however, merely identify that these phe-
nomena exist instead of exploring the determinants of stability and volatility. Some
attempts at characterizing the budgets that experience more or fewer punctuations
and incremental changes compare the distributions across policy types (Jordan 2003)
or institutional structures (Jones et al. 2009).
While this does lead to some description of reasons for incremental and punctu-
ated changes, it does not control for other competing hypotheses. Robinson et al.
(2007) provide the first multivariate hypothesis test of the magnitude of policy
change. By categorizing the size of changes, Robinson et al. (2007) are able to use
multinomial logit to test for other organizational factors (organization size, growth,
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centralization) that can affect the degree of budgetary punctuations. In another ar-
ticle, Robinson, Flink, and King (Forthcoming) split the distribution of changes into
two categories: punctuated or not punctuated. Using a logit model, this paper ex-
amines the role of organization history in explaining punctuations while controlling
for the variables in the Robinson et al. (2007) model.
As the literature moves in this direction, it becomes important for scholars to
reflect on how the monetary size and type of changes are categorized as incremental,
non-incremental, or punctuations. To expand the understanding of the determinants
of budgetary processes, there must be some consistency and clarity in the different
ways in which categories of changes can be determined. If scholars continue to refer
to their individual operationalizations using the broad umbrella term “incremental,”
then there is little hope in escaping this muddled mess.
In this section, a framework is developed to synthesize the unique operational-
izations of incremental, nonincremental, and punctuated changes with regards to
budgets. Apart from works that have reviewed the operationalization of incremen-
talism by comparing the works of individual scholars, this section uses mathematical
models as a more generalizable presentation of unique types of incremental measure-
ment schemes. Four different types of incrementalism are presented and elaborated
by how authors have applied each in the budgetary literature. The hope is that schol-
ars can adopt these terms to describe the type of incrementalism they are examining
in their own work.
2.2 Single Budgets: Simple Comparisons
The subsection below introduces the model that will be expanded upon in this
section.
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2.2.1 The Basic Model
The first consideration in determining the magnitude of policy changes must be
the budget of interest. For the purposes here, a budget (B) for any one context and
year will be denoted as:
B = xit (2.1)
Where:
x is the dollar amount budgeted,
i is the context, and
t is time.
Each of these variables warrant further discussion.
In this work, x is defined as an actual dollar amount and can be any positive
value. However, depending on the researcher’s needs, the measurement of x can take
different forms. In some cases, hierarchical structures in the budgetary process direct
its measurement. For example, x can be the proportion of funds for a single program
from the overall budget. Berry (1990) refers to these as “share of the budget” mod-
els. These models have been enhanced with other types of measures like “prosperity
scores” (Natchez and Bupp 1973; Gist 1982; Danziger 1976). When x is a proportion,
it can only take values from 0 to 100. This type of measurement of x is possible when
studying programs or agencies that are funded from larger budgets like governments
and organizations. Budgetary studies that encompass entire governments or organi-
zations, for example the United States Total Budgetary Appropriations, cannot be
a proportion of funds since the entire budget is being analyzed.
The subscript i denotes the context of the budget. Context refers to two compo-
nents: the institution or program and budgetary stage. There have been many dif-
ferent institutional contexts to budgetary studies: government agencies, local, state,
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federal governments from multiple countries, and organizations. Specific programs
within each of these entities have been analyzed, as well. Each of these institutions
and programs has displayed elements of incrementalism punctuated equilibrium the-
ory.
In addition, i can also represent different parts or stages of the budget–expenditures,
requests, or appropriations. Each of these types of budgets is utilized individually or
in combination in budgetary research. In analyzing just one type of budget, scholars
can determine how they fluctuate through time and what influences those changes.
Comparatively, scholars can study the differences between each of the budgets at any
point in time as well as analyze the dynamic relationship and bargaining processes
between those involved in the budgetary process. For example, in the United States
budgetary context, the relationship between agencies, Congress, and the president
can be analyzed by looking at each of their proposals and the final appropriated
amount. If comparisons need to be made to i across institutions, policy types, or
budgetary stages, they will be denoted by j or k.
The time variable, t, is predominantly measured annually. The annual date
marker depends on whether the fiscal, calendar, or electoral year is the focus of
the study. The value of t is any positive integer number.
2.2.2 One: Relative Budget Incrementalism
The first of the four types of incrementalism is Relative Budget Incrementalism
(RBI). This idea is founded in Dye (1992) definition of incrementalism as the sta-
bility in the distribution of funds by existing functional categories. This type of
incrementalism compares different institutions, programs, or policy types (i) relative
to one another in the same time period t. In other words, it is concerned with the
relative ranking of budget categories (from least to greatest amount). For example,
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if the top most funded program continues to be the most funded program in the fu-
ture, the process could be incremental. If in a specific time period another program
becomes the most funded, surpassing the other program, this process is deemed non-
incremental. Hence, to judge incrementalism, one needs a spectrum of budgetary
programs to compare and contrast dollar amounts. In mathematical notation, this
must always hold true for any value of t for a process to be incremental:
RBI = xit < xjt < xkt (2.2)
Where i, j, k are unique budget categories.
In this concept of measurement, non-incremental changes occur when a program
surpasses the funds of another program it once lagged. Using the notation, a non-
incremental process can be defined as:
xi(t−1) < xk(t−1) < xj(t−1) (2.3)
xit < xjt < xkt (2.4)
As you can see, k’s budget became greater than j’s budget from t− 1 to t.
To better illustrate this type of incrementalism, numerical examples are below
for hypothetical programs i and j. We see that:
xi(t−2) = 3.500, xi(t−1) = 5.250, xit = 7.875
xj(t−2) = 4.000, xj(t−1) = 5.000 , xjt = 4.700
Comparing these two programs by year:
xi(t−2) < xj(t−2) = 3.500 < 4.000
xi(t−1) > xj(t−1) = 5.250 > 5.000
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xi(t) > xj(t) = 7.875 > 4.700
The move from t − 2 to t − 1 is relative budget non-incrementalism since i’s
budget grows larger than j’s budget. The move from t − 1 to t is relative budget
incrementalism since i stays larger than j.
2.2.3 Two: Procedural Incrementalism
Others have recognized incrementalism as the regularity of structural relation-
ships in budgetary procedure among actors whom determine budgets (Dempster
and Wildavsky 1979). This is Procedural Incrementalism. Overall, it is concerned
with consistency in the manner by which budgets are decided. A punctuation, non-
incremental change, or “deviant” case (Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky 1966) occurs
when the relationship among budgetary actors, decision rules among participants,
or other factors in the environment are adjusted. Deviant cases–or procedural non-
incrementalism–can be placed into four broader groups: political, administrative,
economic, and social (Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky 1974). Examples include:
significant policy change, fiscal policy change, additional Congressional supervision,
amended estimate due to time factor, single event, large new legislative program,
change in the partisanship of government leaders, or reorganization of an agency
(Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky 1966). This is the only type of incrementalism
that cannot be determined by solely examining the budget numbers–researchers must
become aware of the environment of the budgeting process.
Following the same mathematical notation, a change is procedural incremental if
the temporal sequence of elements is such:
xi(t−1), xit (2.5)
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A change is procedural non-incremental if the temporal sequence of elements is
such:
xi(t−1), xi′t (2.6)
Where i′ denotes a change in the structural relationship of budgetary actors.
2.3 Multiple Budgets: Budget Growth and Decline
One shortcoming of evaluating the dollar amount allocated to every program is its
limited use in comparing budgets. As Natchez and Bupp (1973) explain, “programs
vary widely in their scope, size, and content, and these differences are unfortunately
reflected in their budgets.” The actual dollar amount or the proportion of funds
can be misleading in judging a budget’s priority or value to society. To cope with
this, scholars needed a way to “normalize” the empirical study of budgets. As a
result, incrementalism was re-conceptualized by analyzing the growth and decline of
a budget over time. Emphasis was placed on how closely the budget of the previous
year matched the current year.
At the most basic form of growth and decline, incrementalism would be measured
as the difference between this year’s and last year’s budget amount. Using the
framework, the operationalization would be:
xit − xi(t−1) (2.7)
Another setting for the simple subtraction is the difference between the dollar
amount at various budget stages in the same time period. One common application of
this involves the difference between agency requests and congressional appropriations
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(Fenno and Jr. 1966; Sharkansky 1968). This would look like:
xit − xjt (2.8)
Where i and j are unique budgetary stages.
Beyond the annual difference in funds, other studies examine the percentage dif-
ference between two consecutive annual budgets (Robinson, Flink, and King Forth-
coming; Robinson et al. 2007; White 1994; Breunig 2006; Breunig and Koski 2006;
Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen 2003; Jones, Baumgartner, and True 1998; Fenno and
Jr. 1966). Annual percentage changes allow a systematic comparison of the magni-
tude of change between organizations and years that cannot be offered from simple
subtraction.
The formula for percentage change is:
xit − xi(t−1)
xi(t−1)
(2.9)
At the introduction of this method of measuring incrementalism, scholars dis-
agreed about whether to include negative values or only report the absolute value of
percentage change. Literature that did not distinguish between positive and negative
modifications to the budget used the formula:
∣∣∣∣xit − xi(t−1)xi(t−1)
∣∣∣∣ (2.10)
2.3.1 Three: Mathematical Incrementalism
In a popular definition, a budget is incremental and stable if its annual percentage
change is within some predefined boundary. Non-incremental changes are those
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observations outside of the boundary. This operationalization of incrementalism is
called Mathematical Incrementalism because the determinant of incremental versus
non-incremental is a number predefined as a cut point. Furthermore, each annual
change is an independent event in the measurement–various annual changes do not
influence one another in their categorization of incremental and non-incremental.
The uniqueness of Mathematical Incrementalism will become clearer once the final
type of incrementalism is discussed in the next subsection.
In addition to disagreements on whether a negative change could be considered as
incremental, scholars debated the percentage size that could be categorized as incre-
mental. In turn, the threshold between incremental and non-incremental categories
has varied in the literature. Among the works that exclusively examine positive
changes, incremental observations were between zero and ten percent (Wildavsky
1964; Bailey and O’Connor 1975; Fenno and Jr. 1966) or as an extension, zero to 20
percent (Fenno and Jr. 1966).
Using the same framework, incremental observations with absolute value percent-
ages meet the requirement that:
∣∣∣∣xit − xi(t−1)xi(t−1)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ C (2.11)
Where:
C is a predefined cut point between incremental and non-incremental values.
It follows that non-incremental observations will meet the criteria that:
∣∣∣∣xi(t) − xi(t−1)xi(t−1)
∣∣∣∣ ≥ C (2.12)
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There are, however, drawbacks with grouping together positive and negative val-
ues. One shortcoming is that it masks much of the variation and, in turn, limits
theoretical developments on predicting increases and decreases in budgets for non-
incremental and incremental values. On the practical side of budgeting, the impli-
cations of a gradually decreasing budget are different than a gradually increasing
budget. All of these small changes can be lumped into the sole incremental category,
but have drastically different implications for the organization over time.
As another consequence, studies that examine the causes or characteristics of
stable and volatile budgets were not able to consider the direction of the change
(positive or negative). The catalysts, though, for positive and negative changes are
unique. Even today this theoretical question has not been fully examined and many
questions still remain on the topic. My preliminary analyses (discussed in later
sections of this dissertation) suggest that the causes for decreases are different than
the causes for increases in budgets.
Another drawback of the absolute value measure is that the proportion of posi-
tive to negative changes could not be assessed. Upon splitting the changes by their
parity, it was observed that the probability of experiencing each type of punctua-
tion was different–there tended to be more positive than negative changes (Jones
et al. 2009). The magnitude of the positive and negative values were also dissimilar:
positive values are more positive than negative values are negative. The absolute
value of changes does not allow for these distinctions. Once scholars began to pay
attention to the parity of the percentage change, the cut point measurement system
was tweaked. The demarcation was no longer symmetric for positive and negative
changes–the positive boundary was more positive and the lower boundary was less
negative to create two unique negative and positive cut points. For example, Jones,
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Baumgartner, and True (1998) and True (2000) both used negative and positive
incremental cut points of -15 and 20 percent, respectively.
Robinson et al. (2007) and Robinson, Flink, and King (Forthcoming) take a
different approach to determine the cut points by overlaying a normal distribution
on the leptokurtic distribution of annual budget changes. These two distributions
have four intersections, two above and two below the mean. Incremental changes are
those observations between the interior intersections–10 and -2 percent.
The new general form of analysis for incremental changes became:
Ca ≤ xit − xi(t−1)
xi(t−1)
≤ Cb (2.13)
And for non-incremental changes:
Ca ≥ xit − xi(t−1)
xi(t−1)
(2.14)
Or,
xit − xi(t−1)
xi(t−1)
≥ Cb (2.15)
Where:
Ca is the lower bound cut point, and
Cb is the upper bound cut point.
Variables Ca are Cb are, again, usually percentage values. Ca is usually a negative
value and Cb is a positive value. However, as explained above, these two variables
usually do not hold the same absolute value. The absolute value of Ca tends to be
smaller than Cb .
The above measurement scheme is for a dichotomous categorization of incremen-
tal versus non-incremental changes. With the advent of Punctuated Equilibrium
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Theory, a modified categorization system was introduced that split the distribution
of changes into five distinct groups with an additional two “punctuation” categories.
The additional two categories applied more stringent criteria for punctuations by
using extreme positive and extreme negative cut points.
Similar to the measurement of small changes, the size requirement of a punctu-
ation has varied and been somewhat arbitrary in the literature. In some articles, a
punctuated change is 30 percent or larger (Wildavsky 1964; Bailey and O’Connor
1975; Baumgartner and Jones 2010). Jordan (2003) identifies positive punctuations
as greater than 35 percent and negative punctuations as less than -25 percent. Robin-
son et al. (2007) and Robinson, Flink, and King (Forthcoming) define the punctua-
tions as below -33 percent and above 35.5 percent using their method of distribution
intersections. These are the outer intersection values between the normal and lep-
tokurtic distributions.
In the mathematical framework, a punctuation exists if:
CA ≥ xit − xi(t−1)
xi(t−1)
(2.16)
Or,
xit − xi(t−1)
xi(t−1)
≥ CB (2.17)
Where:
CA is a more lower bound cut point than Ca, and
CB is an more upper bound cut point than Cb.
These methodological discussions are especially important with the shift towards
quantitative studies in this field and in the discipline as a whole. Some consensus is
needed on a percentage size that constitutes a “small” or “large” change so scholars
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can build upon each other’s work to progress the understanding of budgeting in
governments and organizations.
2.3.2 Four: Political Incrementalism
The final type of incrementalism is Political Incrementalism. In short, it is the
regularity in the annual change in appropriation. Berry (1990) refers to this as an
“internalized change model.” It is internal since it relies on budget alterations of the
previous year to accurately predict the change in the budget for the next year. Incre-
mentalism then occurs when a program experiences similar size changes over time.
Unlike Mathematical Incrementalism (which is concerned about each independent
year being within some specified boundary) this operationalization of incremental-
ism relies on annual change comparisons. The annual changes should be close to
identical, not just within some cut point range. This is what creates a political
component to the measurement of incrementalism–the organization obtaining the
expected or same resource growth/decline as the year before. For example, if a pro-
gram receives a 6 percent increase from one year to the next, it probably expects
or aims to achieve a similar size growth in the next term. Political Incrementalism
values the time series components of budget growth and decline.
In analyzing growth, political incrementalism suggests:
xit − xi(t−1)
xi(t−1)
≈ xi(t−1) − xi(t−2)
xi(t−2)
(2.18)
It follows that the difference between the annual changes should be close to zero:
xit − xi(t−1)
xi(t−1)
− xi(t−1) − xi(t−2)
xi(t−2)
≈ 0 (2.19)
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On the other hand, non-incremental changes are not similar in value from year
to year:
xit − xi(t−1)
xi(t−1)
6= xi(t−1) − xi(t−2)
xi(t−2)
(2.20)
For non-incrementalism, it follows that the difference between the annual changes
will not be close to zero:
xit − xi(t−1)
xi(t−1)
− xi(t−1) − xi(t−2)
xi(t−2)
6= 0 (2.21)
Other empirical methods fit the political incrementalism idea. In a regression
framework, one tool is regressing one year’s budget on the next year’s budget and
analyzing the residuals. Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky (1966) employ this method
and examine residuals of their regression models to determine incrementalism. In-
cremental changes are those observations with small residuals. The non-incremental
changes are observations with large residuals that are not explained by their equa-
tions. Bunce and Echols (1978) and Fenno and Jr. (1966) use a regression framework
to check for the linearity of budget changes over time. To determine fiscal shocks,
Rattsø (2004) uses regression, as well.
To help facilitate the difference between mathematical and political incremental-
ism, the budgets of programs i and j are revisited. This time, however, the budgets
are analyzed for their compliance with mathematical and political incrementalism.
The three year budgets for i and j are:
xi(t−2) = 3.500, xi(t−1) = 5.250, xit = 7.875
xj(t−2) = 4.000, xj(t−1) = 5.000 , xjt = 4.700
First, let’s calculate the annual percentage change for each program.
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For program i year t− 1 and t− 2:
5.250− 3.500
3.500
= 0.50 (2.22)
For program i year t and t− 1:
7.875− 5.250
5.250
= 0.50 (2.23)
For program j year t− 1 and t− 2:
5.000− 4.000
4.000
= 0.25 (2.24)
For program j year t and t− 1:
4.700− 5.000
5.000
= −0.06 (2.25)
Now, substitute these values into the model for mathematical incrementalism.
Cut points will be defined as:
Ca = −0.15
Cb = 0.30
For program i, both changes (both equal to 0.50) are outside of the incremental
cut point bounds. This means program i experienced non-incremental changes–it
did not meet the requirements for mathematical incrementalism. Program j, on the
other hand, had changes between the cut points (0.25 and -0.06) and does meet the
requirements for mathematical incrementalism.
Now consider political incrementalism. Program i experienced the same size
change each year, therefore, it did meet the requirements for political incrementalism.
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The growth over the time span was constant. Program j had a .31 difference in
the annual changes (0.25 - (-0.06)). This value exceeds the boundary for political
incrementalism–it is politically non-incremental.
This example illustrates that a budget series can meet the requirements for some
types of incremental operationalizations, but not others. Program i met the require-
ments for political incrementalism, but not mathematical incrementalism. Program
j under went mathematical incrementalism, but not political incrementalism. As
is evident, the way in which scholars define incrementalism can lead to divergent
results. Researchers need to be cognizant of the consequences of the type of incre-
mentalism they choose to measure and report in their work. Otherwise, the term
“incremental” will continue to be a muddled mess.
2.4 Conclusion
In this work, four types of incrementalism are presented: Relative, Procedural,
Mathematical, and Political. Relative incrementalism is about the stability in the
ranking of the funds spent on programs. Procedural incrementalism examines the
environment in which budgetary decisions are made. Mathematical incrementalism
measures whether the annual percentage change of a budget remains within a pre-
defined boundary. Political incrementalism evaluates the consistency of growth or
decline of program budgets.
To help clear much of the confusion that surrounds the term “incrementalism,”
these terms are intended to be used as descriptors of the type of incrementalism
scholars measure in their work. Since there will never be just one way to measure
incremental or punctuated changes, scholars must be clear with the type of incremen-
talism they are evaluating. However, there are more complexities to the budgeting
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process that are not considered in these four types of incrementalism measurement
schemes.
For example, not assessed are the hierarchical issues in the budgetary process–how
program budgets fluctuate compared to the overall budget changes. To explain, if the
overall budget has a two percent budget decrease, do all the programs that stem from
the larger budget have two percent decreases as well? Do some programs take larger
cuts to protect the funding levels of other programs? This aspect has not yet been
implemented into the measurement of incremental and non-incremental changes. In
this, would programs that follow the overall budget trend be incremental, no matter
the size of change? Would programs with non-incremental changes be those that do
not follow the overall budget trend, even if the program budget is stable and the
overall budget is not stable?
There are many factors that influence how researchers measure and categorize
sizes of changes. This work represents one way to synthesize the concepts surrounding
the operationalization of incremental, non-incremental, and punctuated changes.
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3. THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION OF BUDGETARY CHANGES
3.1 Introduction
The factors influencing the stability of budgetary resources have been studied
by many scholars. Typically, these studies occur through the lense of punctuated
equilibrium theory (PET). In broad terms, scholars have identified disproportionate
information processing, institutional friction, and organizational history as reasons
for why policy systems experience punctuated changes.
What has not been considered is the role of organizational features outside of the
policy process on influencing budgetary stability and volatility. While the level of
decision clearance, centralization, or veto players have proved remarkably robust in
affecting the distribution of policy changes, little is known how the characteristics of
organizations that give substance to the policy-makers’ discussions or the needs of
the organization influence budgetary changes. These factors can jolt an organization
into making rapid alterations. This study examines two features–organizational per-
formance and personnel stability–to assess how factors outside of the policy process
itself can cause friction in a system.
3.2 Literature
The subsections below discuss the literature on incrementalism and PET.
3.2.1 Models of Policy Change
Incrementalism is part of the foundation of policy change studies. This is es-
pecially true in the field of public budgeting. The field has dedicated decades to
explaining how incrementalism applies–or does not apply–to public budgeting (Wil-
davsky 1964; Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky 1966; Wanat 1974). In analysis of
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budgets from every level of government, country, agency, or organization, the same
general incremental pattern is present: there are mostly small changes from year
to year, supporting incrementalism (Cornia and Usher 1981; Davis, Dempster, and
Wildavsky 1974). Incrementalism though, is not readily accepted by all budget-
ing scholars. For one, the term “incrementalism” has become conceptually diffuse.
Scholars have used the term to describe a method of problem solving, a process of
interaction, a theory of organizational behavior, a theory of policy development, a
shift in organizational relationships, and the size of monetary change (Berry 1990;
Dempster and Wildavsky 1979). With this many meanings, some scholars have
questioned if incrementalism is still a useful term for scholarly works (Berry 1990).
However, despite critiques noting the theoretical and empirical shortcomings of in-
crementalism (i.e. Berry (1990); Dempster and Wildavsky (1979); Tucker (1982);
Bailey and O’Connor (1975); Natchez and Bupp (1973)), the theory could not be
wholly rejected or replaced with all new theories. Hence, it still remains relevant to
budgetary studies today.
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET), borrowed from geological studies, emerged
as another theory of the policy process that embraced incrementalism and incorpo-
rated the expectation for large changes–a missing element of the incremental theory
(Baumgartner and Jones 2010). In this theory, Baumgartner and Jones (2010) re-
late the policy process to phenomena from the physical sciences like earthquakes
and landslides. To explain, earthquakes occur as a result of slowly building pressure
from underneath the earth’s surface that causes violent shifts of the earth’s tectonic
plates. The dramatic shift of the earth’s plates causes earthquakes. The process
of landslides follows a similar pattern. The over time build up of soil, rocks, and
sand will yield small changes in the terrain. Eventually though, landslides occur and
massively change the area.
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Keeping with the bigger picture, these are slow moving processes that eventually
lead to dramatic events. Policy processes work in much the same way. Policies
typically experience modest changes. Over time though, pressure builds within the
policy system from inadequate policy changes. Features of the policy process hinder
policy changes from creating an efficient market where policy levels equal policy
demands. When slow moving policy processes accumulate enough pressure within the
policy system, a large and dramatic policy change results. In punctuated equilibrium
theory, these large changes are known as punctuations.
This theory has been supported in many contexts from incarceration rates (Schnei-
der 2006) to election results (Baumgartner et al. 2009), legislative actions (i.e. bill in-
troductions and hearings; (Baumgartner et al. 2009)), environmental policy (Repetto
2006; Busenberg 2004; Wood 2006; Salka 2004), and education (McLendon 2003).
The dominant testing ground, though, has been in the field of public budgeting. Lo-
cal, state, comparative, and United States federal government, agencies, and public
organizations have all exhibited characteristics consistent with PET (Jones, Baum-
gartner, and True 1998; Robinson 2004; Baumgartner, Foucault, and Franc¸ois 2006;
Breunig and Koski 2006; Jordan 2003; Mortensen 2005; Breunig 2006; John and
Margetts 2003; Jones et al. 2009; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Robinson et al. 2007).
Determining a series’ conformity with punctuated equilibrium theory has relied
on assessing the shape of the distribution of annual percentage policy changes (annual
percentage budgetary changes, in the case of budgetary studies). The distribution
is analyzed for how closely it follows a normal distribution. Specifically, the degree
of kurtosis (a measure of central “peakedness”) is examined. Distributions that sup-
port punctuated equilibrium theory have high values of kurtosis (well above three,
the kurtosis value of a normal distribution). Distributions with high levels of kurtosis
are known as leptokurtic distributions–distributions with significantly more central
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observations around the mean and in the tails of the distribution than a normal dis-
tribution. Theoretically, this is what punctuated equilibrium theory predicts of the
policy change process: mostly incremental changes with numerous sizable changes.
This leptokurtic distribution, also known as a power function, is central to punctu-
ated equilibrium studies. It has proven extremely robust and is now advocated as a
general empirical law (Jones et al. 2009).
The punctuated equilibrium literature is currently increasing in empirical com-
plexity. Scholars are expanding their work beyond univariate analyses of distributions
to multivariate hypothesis testing that can account for other explanations of policy
changes. The few published works that use multivariate empirical tests predicting
budgetary outcomes have divided the distribution of budgetary changes into cate-
gories based on their size to use either logit (Robinson, Flink, and King Forthcoming)
or multinomial logit (Robinson et al. 2007). This is an important direction for the
literature as it advances understanding of how various features of governments and
organizations influence budgetary changes.
3.2.2 Reasons for PET
The literature on PET identifies two broad reasons for punctuations in policy
changes: disproportionate information processing and institutional friction.
Disproportionate information processing is an artifact of the direction of policy
attention. As the name suggests, this explanation of punctuated equilibrium theory
attributes policy changes to the tendency of policy-makers and policy-making institu-
tions to react disproportionately to new information (Jones 2001). This is in contrast
to proportionate information processing (Jones and Baumgartner 2005) in which pol-
icy makers form policy decisions proportional to information within the environment.
Officials, though, cannot adequately process all information since there is only a lim-
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ited amount of policy attention they can give (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). As a
result, policy systems commonly go through periods of under-responding or ignoring
information to overreacting to it (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Workman, Jones,
and Jochim 2009). The over and under reactions contribute to the leptokurtic shape
of the distribution of policy changes found broadly in policy systems.
Institutional friction, the other explanation for policy punctuations, occurs as a
result of the institutional barriers or decision clearance points in the policy-making
process. Friction is a term used to account for the difficulty in the process of making
policy changes. The more hurdles there are in the process, the more friction there
is within the policy system. This has consequences for policy alterations. While
institutional designs with multiple actors and decision-clearances promote checks
and balances (which provide comfort to citizens), they slow down the policy process.
This in turn, builds pressure within the policy system. Over time, the accumulation
of pressure from inadequate policy modifications, will yield a punctuation.
There have been many different ways in which friction has been measured. The
measure is meant to describe the concentration of power or the barriers in deciding
policy changes. Institutional friction has been measured by bureaucratization (bro-
ken down to centralization and organization size), stage in the policy cycle, political
system (presidential or parliamentary), executive dominance, single-party govern-
ments, bicameralism, partisan control of government, partisan distance of governing
parties, and decentralization (Robinson et al. 2007; Robinson 2004; Jones et al. 2009;
Baumgartner et al. 2009; Breunig 2006). Empirically, each of these factors affects
the degree of kurtosis in the distribution of policy changes.
These reasons for punctuations–disproportionate information processing and in-
stitutional friction–suggest unique expectations about how the history punctuations
influence the probability for future punctuations. Robinson, Flink, and King (Forth-
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coming) develop two theoretical models of the effect of organizational history on
punctuations. In the Error Accumulation model, the probability of an organiza-
tion experiencing a punctuation is negatively related to having one in the recent
past. In this model, punctuations occur to correct the policy system to the desired
level of policy. Once this correction has been made, policies will only see incremen-
tal changes until the distance between the actual and desired level of policy reach
a certain threshold. This approach is consistent with ideas from disproportionate
information processing.
The other model of policy change is the “Institutional Model” of policy change
that states large policy changes occur from characteristics within the organization
(like poor institutional design or mismanagement) 1. Since the propensity of punc-
tuations is tied to the organizational design, the probability of having a punctuated
change is positively related to having one in the recent past. Institutional friction
arguments support this model of punctuated policy change. This is the finding by
Robinson, Flink, and King (Forthcoming)–punctuations occur in clusters. In other
words, a history of punctuations yields a higher probability that organizations will
have a punctuation in the future.
3.3 Theory–Untested Sources of Friction: Institutional and Non-Institutional
Friction
Literature has demonstrated that institutional friction influences budgetary changes.
There are, however, common characteristics of the measures of institutional friction
that leave open many questions about other sources of friction within policy systems.
1Some may view the terms “poor institutional design or mismanagement” as strong language
since the cited study does not consider organizational performance–it did not test if the punctuated
budget changes actually affected performance. The expectation, though, is that large and rapid
budgetary changes will negatively influence performance. To give some support, Andersen and
Mortensen (2010) find results in line with their growth hypothesis that sustained small, positive
budgetary changes positively impact performance.
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For one, measures have been endogenous to–conceptualized within–the policy pro-
cess. Indeed, this was one of the original goals of this research agenda–examining the
policy consequences of structures of policy systems. Prior to punctuated equilibrium
theory, little was known about how the structure of the policy process shaped policy
outcomes. Early explanations centered on factors exogenous to–outside of–the pro-
cess decision-makers must follow to set policy. For example, the political, economic,
social, and administrative environments were said to influence policy changes (Davis,
Dempster, and Wildavsky 1974).
Punctuated equilibrium literature, however, has progressed in explaining the en-
dogenous factors, while it has left the exogenous factors virtually unexplored. While
PET is a theory of government information processing (Workman, Jones, and Jochim
2009), there are other elements to organizations outside of the policy process itself
that can cause friction among decision-makers and in turn, affect policy changes.
This is especially true in the budgeting process. Budgets are not just artifacts of
policy structure–they are pointed decisions made in light of the current demands
or environment of the institution or organization. Public organizations are human
systems that must respond to needs.
The exogenous features of the policy process give substance to the interactions
of those within organizations. In this study, these factors are referred to as Non-
Institutional Friction. These contextual elements can show stress within organiza-
tions and signal a greater need for policy change. By studying attributes of organiza-
tions that cause tension among decision-makers (not just the institutional arrange-
ments that affect how outputs are agreed upon) a deeper understanding of friction
and the sources of punctuations can be achieved.
A second common feature of the institutional friction policy process measures
is their relative stability over time. The fixed measures allow for comparisons of
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the institutional arrangements over time–an essential component to understanding
the policy change process. However, many aspects of organizations are not stable
over time. There are many theoretically interesting questions related to how policy
stability persists in light of factors that change frequently within the organization.
Instability and uncertainty within organizations create another type of friction that
can jolt an organization.
This study addresses both of these points by examining two organizational charac-
teristics that are outside of the institutional decision-making structure and fluctuate
over time: organizational performance and personnel instability. These are two im-
portant and salient elements to virtually all organizations (Rainey 2003). They are
constantly monitored and taken into account for many organization decisions. If
either of these features is less than adequate, it can cause issues within the organi-
zation. Most likely, there will be disagreement within the organization on the best
way to improve the quality of outputs and employee retention. How each element
can be a potential source of friction is outlined below.
3.3.1 Organizational Performance
The performance of public organizations is scrutinized by citizens and public offi-
cials. Even though they are generally characterized as under-performing (Moynihan
2008; Rainey 2003), the reason for the existence of public organizations is to pro-
vide quality goods and services to their clientle. Efforts to increase the efficiency
and effectiveness of public organizations have gained momentum. Elected officials
have developed extensive accountability systems to incentivize good and penalize bad
performance in public organizations. A weakness of these policies is their one-size-
fits-all approach. Numerous studies have demonstrated the unequal results of these
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programs across organizations (Rutherford Forthcoming; Moynihan 2008; Rainey
2003; Radin 2006). Public organizations have unique missions, environments, and
multiple dimensions on which to measure performance–suggesting there is no one
way in which they can be motivated or evaluated.
Numerous performance initiatives by government have made attaining set stan-
dards a high stakes endeavor. Performance is virtually the biggest concern for any
organization. Throughout academic work, this is reflected in management and or-
ganization theory’s central focus on explaining different aspects of organization per-
formance and effectiveness (Rainey 2003). The literature assessing the determinants
organizational performance is large and spans many diverse fields. In practice, out-
puts are regularly monitored by public officials, managers, employees, and service re-
cipients. Based on what is observed, current and future target levels of performance
shape organization work and direction. Over and under-performing organizations,
however, must take different approaches to their work. The general assumption is
organizations achieve success through proper management of their internal and exter-
nal environment. When public organizations fall below a set standard, governments
must intervene to help manage the situation.
Organizations with sustained high performance have implemented successful poli-
cies and properly managed their environment. Assuming no government interven-
tions or other environmental shocks, changes to the organization are typically mod-
ifications to existing routines. These organizations are more likely to benefit from
increased resources and support from government or the addition of new clients.
Organizational goals then focus on maintaining current standards and possible ex-
pansion of their work.
There are harsh consequences for under-performing public organizations. With
the push for greater accountability, these organizations are threatened by sanctions,
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penalties, government interventions, and closure. Managers, employees, and clients
want to improve performance, but finding consensus on the best way to achieve that
end is difficult. The choice on what alterations to make within the organization is
complicated by the many options available to decision-makers. Resources, regula-
tion, markets, organization, and management all influence public service performance
(Boyne 2003). Isolating the parts of the organization that need to be changed can
cause conflict and friction. In light of this friction, policy changes are likely to be
large in desperate attempts for performance improvement. Incremental changes are
not likely to provide the jolt needed within the organization to spark performance
increases. This leads to the performance hypotheses:
H1: Low performance decreases the expected proportion of incremental budgetary
changes.
H2: Low performance increases the expected proportion of medium size budgetary
changes.
H3: Low performance increases the expected proportion of punctuated budgetary
changes.
3.3.2 Personnel Instability
One of the core concerns of management is their organization’s workforce. Human
capital is one of the most valuable assets of any organization (Rainey 2003; O’Toole,
Meier et al. 2009). Bringing in new talent, retaining workers, and enhancing the
skills of employees is essential for the organization to have quality performance.
Given the importance of human capital for organization success, personnel instability
(employee turnover) is a relatively understudied area of public administration (Selden
38
and Moynihan 2000; Meier and Hicklin 2008; Raffel 2007). Most works on turnover
analyze its effect on organizational performance. The leading theory is that personnel
instability leads to lower organization performance (O’Toole Jr and Meier 2003;
Meier and Hicklin 2008). However, a refined version of the theory acknowledges
benefits from turnover (like the organization staying fresh, bringing in new ideas,
and the dismissal of ineffective workers) that suggest its nonlinear relationship with
performance (Abelson and Baysinger 1984; Mosher and Kingsley 1936; Meier and
Hicklin 2008).
There remain many research questions on the consequences of employee turnover
beyond performance. This study examines its effect on policy stability. As stated
before, PET focuses on procedures as sources of friction. However, even if struc-
tures and procedures can stay constant, personnel turnover induces another type
of instability for the organization that changes the dynamics among actors (We-
ber 1946). High turnover can signal problems and dissatisfaction among employees
(Rainey 2003). Additional stress occurs by replacing and retraining workers–it can
be a costly endeavor that takes a substantial amount of resources within the organi-
zation (Griffeth and Hom 2001; Wright and Kim 2004). In organizations with high
turnover, there should be more friction overall, yielding more punctuated changes.
Policy-makers may feel the need to enact major policy changes to retain employees.
In organizations with low turnover, the friction models suggest there is less tension
within the organization leading to fewer punctuations. This leads to the personnel
instability hypotheses:
H4: High personnel instability decreases the expected proportion of incremental bud-
getary changes.
H5: High personnel instability increases the expected proportion of medium size bud-
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getary changes.
H6: High personnel instability increases the expected proportion of punctuated bud-
getary changes.
3.4 Data
Empirical analyses of punctuated equilibrium theory require large amounts of
data. Examining rare events (punctuations) takes data sets that cover a long time
span and many organizations. As such, data for this study come from a large data set
of Texas school districts from 1993 to 2010–a long enough time span to examine the
dynamics of punctuated equilibrium. These data provide budgetary, performance,
and administrative information on hundreds of organizations (school districts) with
similar goals of educating students, policy environment, and structure. This data
set has been used in many other studies of punctuated equilibrium (Robinson 2004;
Robinson et al. 2007; Robinson, Flink, and King Forthcoming).
The dependent variable for analysis will be the annual percentage change in
instructional spending per pupil. With some limitations, school districts have dis-
cretion in how they allocate their funds across programs. Instructional spending per
student is one of the core program funds for all school districts and represents one
type of educational strategy that puts funds directly to educating students. Since
this is one of the most important functions of districts, managers will make budgetary
decisions to protect these funds from financial environmental turbulence. Meier and
OToole (2009) find that when the overall budget falls, instructional spending per
student is only cut a fraction compared to the overall budget change. Changes in
this category represent pointed decisions by managers–they do not just reflect the
availability of funds for school districts from state and local sources.
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This study follows methodology proposed in Robinson et al. (2007) by dividing
the budgetary variable into five categories based on the size of changes. The cate-
gories are: negative punctuations, medium negative changes, incremental changes,
medium positive changes, and positive punctuations. 2. The distribution of bud-
getary changes within the five categories is displayed below in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Distribution of budgetary changes in sample.
Change Category Frequency Percent
Negative Punc. 57 0.45
Medium, negative 1964 15.42
Incremental 8675 68.12
Medium, positive 1963 15.42
Positive Punc 75 0.59
N: 12,734. Kurtosis: 41.84.
There are two explanatory variables of interest in this study: organizational
performance and personnel instability. The pass rate among all students on the
statewide standardized test will be used to determine organizational performance.
This is the customary measure of performance in the public administration litera-
ture that uses education data. Personnel instability is the percent of teacher turnover
within a school district. This is another common measure in the education and pub-
lic administration literature (O’Toole Jr and Meier 2003; O’Toole, Meier et al. 2009;
Meier and Hicklin 2008). The lagged values of each of the measures are used in the
2The exact cut point percentage values are -33, -2, 10, and 35.5. These values are the interior and
exterior intersections between a normal distribution overlaid on the histogram of annual percentage
budgetary changes.
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empirical model. Since performance assessment and turnover typically happen at
the end of a school year, it is more plausible the prior year influences the current
year budgetary changes.
Revisiting the two critiques of institutional friction measures (they are only within
the policy process and very stable over time), both of these variables hold up to those
points. In regards to the process, both of these measures are outside of the direct
decision-making process. Organizational performance should influence budgetary
changes, but it is not an indicator of policy processes in the same way as other con-
ceptualizations of institutional friction. Personnel instability is a little less clear on
this issue. The measure actually assesses the stability of teachers. In public admin-
istration terms, teachers are characterized as street-level bureaucrats. While past
measures of institutional friction have considered bureaucratization, it was meant to
indicate a concentration of decision-making. In school districts, budgetary decisions
are a top-down process that typically do not involve input from all levels of the orga-
nization. Teachers, as street-level bureaucrats, do not have a large amount of input
in budgetary decision-making. Thus, this measure of bureaucratization is a measure
of stability, not of centralization of decision-making power.
Fluctuations occur frequently in both of these variables, as well. For example, in
the present sample, the average annual percentage change is 2.99 for performance and
13.45 for turnover. The previously studied variables of friction in this setting were
organization size and centralization. To contrast with performance and turnover, the
average annual percentage change for organization size is 0.75 and 0.54 for central-
ization. Within this sample, there are greater changes, and thus more uncertainty,
for the variables of interest in this study.
To account for institutional friction measures, centralization (percent of school
district’s budget dedicated to central bureaucracy), centralization squared, organi-
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zational size (student enrollment) and growth (percentage change in student enroll-
ment) are included as control variables. History of punctuations in the organization
(experiencing a punctuation within the previous five years) is also included in the
models. These variables are also common to PET articles that use this dataset
(Robinson et al. 2007; Robinson, Flink, and King Forthcoming; Robinson 2004).
Table 3.2 displays the descriptive statistics.
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Organizational Performance 72.42 15.70 6 100
(Standardize test pass rate)
Personnel Instability 17.47 9.51 0 100
(Teacher turnover)
Centralization 7.39 3.71 1 73.30
Centralization Squared 68.31 125.73 1 5372.89
Organization Size (logged) 6.95 1.52 1.95 12.26
Organizational Growth 0.75 7.13 -63.30 117.33
Organizational History No punc.: 11,911 Punc.: 823
(Dummy Variable)
N = 12734.
43
3.5 Methods
This study adds to the literature that examines PET with multivariate statistical
analyses (Robinson et al. 2007; Robinson, Flink, and King Forthcoming). The de-
pendent variable (five categories of budget changes based on size) is designed to use
multinomial logit as the method of analysis. Multinomial logit is used when the de-
pendent variable consists of categories that are unordered and discrete3. The method
calculates the probability of explanatory variables being in one category compared
to a baseline category. In this analysis, the baseline category is small, incremental
changes. The coefficients are to be interpreted as the medium or punctuated changes
(whatever the relevant category may be) compared to incremental changes.
3.6 Results
The results of the multinomial logit model are shown in Table 3.3. 4. The
coefficients are meant to be interpreted in comparison to the baseline category of
incremental changes.
3Even though there is an order to the categories (positive to negative), the hypotheses are based
on magnitude of the change (incremental to punctuated). This makes it unclear how to order
positive and negative changes of the same magnitude. Because of this, there is no clear way to
order the categories. Thus, multinomial logit is used instead of ordered logit.
4Diagnostic tests did not reveal multicollinearity among variables The model was estimated
with robust standard errors, but the results were the same. The present study does violate the
IIA assumption made for multinomial logit models. Multinomial probit was used and results were
similar to the logit models. Year fixed-effects were used, but the results still held. The standardized
test switched from TAAS to TAKS in 2003. The results are still robust with the exclusion of this
year
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Table 3.3: The effects of organizational characteristics on the relative probability of
experiencing large and medium versus small budgetary changes.
Size of Change: Negative Medium, Medium, Positive
Punc. negative positive Punc.
Organizational Performance -0.234 -0.007 -0.034 -0.044
(Standardize test pass rate lagged) -3.25 -3.79 -20.42 -6.99
Personnel Instability 0.033 0.022 -0.002 0.013
(Teacher turnover lagged) 3.91 7.86 -0.79 1.56
Centralization -0.083 -0.223 -0.164 -0.202
-1.29 -11.44 -8.39 -3.46
Centralization Squared 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.004
2.18 7.37 6.25 3.41
Organization Size -0.725 -0.470 -0.482 -1.090
(logged) -4.99 -17.80 -17.95 -8.43
Organizational History 2.155 0.631 0.191 1.247
6.57 6.45 1.79 4.35
Organizational Growth 0.014 0.032 -0.008 0.011
1.47 9.24 -2.14 1.16
Z-score below each coefficient. N = 12734.
LR Test: 1730.76, p<0.00.
BIC: 21,301.385. Pseudo R2: 0.08.
PCP: 68.75% PMP: 68.12% PRE: 1.95%
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3.6.1 Results: Organizational Performance
Organization performance is negative and statistically significant in each of the
categories. This means as performance improves, it is significantly less likely that
organizations will experience nonincremental changes. To help illustrate the effect of
organizational performance, Figure 3.1 shows the predicted probability of experienc-
ing each of the five categories of budgetary change over the range of test pass rates. In
this set of predicted probabilities, all other variables are set to their mean values. In-
cremental changes see dramatic growth as organization performance improves. This
is consistent with Hypothesis 1. The two categories of medium size changes have
unique patterns over the range of performance that give mixed support for Hypoth-
esis 2. Medium size positive changes significantly decrease as performance improves.
For organizations with less than a twenty percent pass rate, positive medium changes
are the most prevalent at about a 60 percent probability. For the highest performing
organizations, medium positive changes decrease probability to under ten percent.
Medium negative changes do not see much of a change over the spectrum of pass
rates. They are predicted to be used about ten percent of the time. Punctuated
changes (positive and negative) are both very small in their predicted probabilities.
In closer examination, there is little change in their probabilities over performance.
This does not support Hypothesis 3.
3.6.2 Results: Personnel Instability
Personnel instability is positive and statistically significant for the negative cat-
egories of changes and insignificant for the positive changes. This means that as
turnover increases, organizations are more likely to experience negative medium and
punctuated budgetary changes than incremental changes. Similar to Figure 3.1, Fig-
ure 3.2 displays the predicted probabilities for each of the five categories of change
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Figure 3.1: Performance with variables at means.
over the range of teacher turnover with all other variables held at their means. At
the lowest levels of teacher turnover, incremental changes are expected about 70
percent of the time. At the highest levels of turnover, incremental changes are only
expected 40 to 50 percent of the time. This declining trend supports Hypothesis
4. Hypothesis 5 again has mixed results. In support, negative medium size changes
increase as personnel instability increases. Against Hypothesis 5, medium positive
changes see a slight decrease as turnover increases. Punctuations were expected to
increase with turnover, however, there is little support for this hypothesis.
Lastly, the control variables are examined to check for consistency with prior
studies. Every variable is significant in the expected direction except centralization–
it is statistically significant in the negative direction for three of the categories. This
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Figure 3.2: Turnover with variables at means.
is a contradiction to past studies (Robinson et al. 2007; Robinson 2004) that have
indicated an increase in centralization yields greater probabilities of nonincremental
changes. However, this model contains a variable for centralization squared that is
positive and statistically significant. This suggests a nonlinear U shaped relationship
between centralization and budgetary changes. At higher levels of centralization,
there will be a greater propensity for nonincremental budgetary changes.
3.6.3 Most and Least Punctuated Profiles
This subsection offers an extension on the predicted probability graphs for per-
formance and turnover. Using knowledge from the literature, two new predicted
probability profiles are created for each variable–a most and least punctuated pro-
file. These are constructed by setting the control variables in the model to the first
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or third quartile value, depending on what should theoretically yield more or less
punctuations. Table 3.4 shows each profile below.
Table 3.4: Predicted probability profiles for most and least punctuations.
Variable Mean Most Punctuated Least Punctuated
Organizational Performance 72.42 59 81.9
Personnel Instability 17.47 21.5 11.2
Centralization 7.39 9 5.5
Centralization Squared 68.31 81 30.25
Organization Size (logged) 6.95 5.7 7.7
Organizational History 0.06 1 0
Organizational Growth 0.75 0.75 0.75
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the most and least punctuated profiles for organization
performance. In organizations where friction is high (the most punctuated profile),
there are much greater chances for nonincremental changes. For the lowest per-
forming organizations in a system with great amounts of friction, there is over a
ten percent chance for a positive punctuation. As performance improves though,
this probability approaches back to zero. Comparing incremental changes across the
two scenarios, the predicted probability drops about 20 percent in the most punctu-
ated profile. These results illustrate that even in these least similar policy systems,
organization performance still influences budgetary stability and volatility.
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Figure 3.3: Performance with variables set to most punctuated profile.
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Figure 3.4: Performance with variables set to least punctuated profile.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show the most and least punctuated profiles for personnel
instability. While the probability of incremental changes has the expected downward
trend, the line overall takes nearly a 30 percent drop in higher friction systems. The
probability of punctuations is nearly nonexistent in the least punctuated profile.
However, there is a growing probability of punctuations as turnover increases for
the most punctuated profile. Also as expected, positive and negative medium size
changes are more likely to occur in the more punctuated profile. Positive medium
changes decrease and negative medium changes increase as turnover grows. This
shows that in either policy system, as turnover increases organizations are more
likely to scale back their expenditures in this program.
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Figure 3.5: Turnover with variables set to most punctuated profile.
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Figure 3.6: Turnover with variables set to least punctuated profile.
3.7 Conclusion
This study provides a broader scope to the term institutional friction by incor-
porating non-institutional friction measures. More than just the process of making
policy, organization features can influence budgetary stability and volatility. Even
with high and low levels of policy process friction, these organizational features influ-
ence budgetary changes. Theoretically, this study demonstrates how policy stability
prevails amidst an unstable environment. As hypothesized, high organization perfor-
mance and low personnel instability increase the propensity of incremental changes.
There was little support for a change in the probability of punctuations (positive or
negative) over the range of performance or turnover.
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The effect of each of these organizational features on positive and negative medium
size changes was interesting. Literature typically hypothesizes that all medium size
changes to have similar probabilities. This study shows that negative and positive
changes occur in unique circumstances. Furthermore, the findings suggest the trends
in the propensity of positive and negative changes can be opposing–one can be an
upward trend while the other is a downward trend. Scholars should begin to theorize
about the different situations when one might expect positive or negative changes.
There are several extensions for future studies. Analyses considered only the
absolute level of performance. Future work should examine the growth hypotheses–
how the changes in performance affect budgetary changes. To explain, individual
organizations have unique target levels for performance. For some schools, 75 percent
student test pass rate is acceptable. For another organization, 75 percent is extremely
low. Perhaps a steady decline or growth in performance, whatever the absolute level
may be, affects budgetary changes.
This study contributes to our understanding of budgetary change, but more
broadly, adds to our knowledge of how managers address organizational issues through
the budgetary process. The non-institutional exogenous factors clearly shaped the
magnitude of budgetary changes. Coupling these findings with measures of institu-
tional friction, a richer understanding of policy changes was gained. Within both
punctuated and non-punctuated policy systems, decision-makers responded to en-
vironmental demands (organizational performance and personnel instability). How-
ever, across the two structures, there were clear differences in how frequently each
magnitude of size of budgetary change occurred. This has implications for how or-
ganizations can address problems or make policy changes as needed. Organizations
can be facing the same issues, but the structure can influence how they are ad-
dressed. While this does support the foundation of PET–structure shapes outcomes–
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this study adds to this by showing that other factors outside of the structure can jolt
the organization.
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4. ORDERING CHAOS: THE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES OF
BUDGETARY CHANGES
4.1 Introduction
In today’s fiscal climate, governments and organizations are no stranger to rapid
budget changes. Bureaucrats and managers are expected to sustain organizational
performance and stabilize operations with sudden, tight financial constraints. On
the other side, budgets can be increased (or restored), calling for managers to ap-
propriately direct funds to improve organizational performance. Different financial
inputs call for unique strategies among those within the organization. In other words,
organization growth and decline present different challenges.
Maintaining or improving performance in the organization is one of the most
important (if not, the most important) tasks for managers. This is especially difficult
with a diverse clientle with changing demands. Organization outcomes are the focus
of elected officials and citizens. If performance slips, blame can quickly be directed to
those in charge of and working within an organization. Prolonged poor performance
can lead to job loss or sanctions placed on the organization. This increases the
job difficulty for managers of organizations. Despite whatever “chaos” may come,
management is expected to stabilize and bring order to the organization.
Drawing from punctuated equilibrium theory (PET), this paper examines how
budgetary changes affect alterations to organizational performance. In the budgetary
context, PET has demonstrated that budgets experience mostly small changes but
also numerous large punctuated changes. Even with an extensive literature explain-
ing the shape of the distribution of budgetary changes, there has been no work to
connect PET to organization outcomes. This paper studies the distribution of per-
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formance changes and compares it to budgetary changes to assess how organizations
transfer inputs to outputs. Initial findings indicate that the distribution of perfor-
mance changes is closer to a normal distribution than the distribution of budgetary
changes, supporting the notion that management can create stable outputs from an
organization with unstable inputs.
Although there has been much work on the consequences of financial changes on
performance in the public administration and budgetary literatures, this work has not
comprehensively examined all sizes of budgetary changes–large, small, positive, and
negative. Academic work typically focuses on one piece or type of financial change at
a time. This section considers five different categories of budgetary changes (common
to empirical work in PET) from large negative to large positive to understand how
they influence performance. By extending PET to consider organization outcomes,
a new understanding can be gained on the connection between financial resource
volatility and performance stability. Descriptive statistics, histograms, and regression
analysis all support that organizations and management can normalize operations
despite financial turbulence.
In the context of Texas public school districts for almost a 20 year period, the
present study examines how the core performance objectives (student pass rates on
standardized tests) in organizations change in light of financial changes to core pro-
gram funding (instructional spending per student). In general, results indicate that
organizations are able to regularize performance. Massive budget cuts, surprisingly,
typically lead to only small decreases in performance. On the other side, sizable
financial increases produce performance increases.
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4.2 Literature
The next subsection gives a review of the policy change process in the context of
PET.
4.2.1 Friction in the Policy Process
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory is centered on explaining the policy process–more
particularly, how policies change over time. In an ideal world, one would expect that
actual policy levels change in accordance to policy demand. This, however, does
not typically occur. Punctuated Equilibrium Theory demonstrates how institutional
and cognitive factors slow the policy process and prevent policy levels from acting
as an efficient market where actual policy level equals policy demand. These institu-
tional and cognitive barriers to decision-making yield policies with mostly incremen-
tal changes, but also overly large, punctuated changes. This results in distributions
of policy changes that diverge from a normal distribution. This phenomenon has
been extensively studied throughout this literature. The robust finding–now ad-
vocated as a general, empirical law–is that the distribution of changes in policies
is leptokurtic–charcterized by tall central peaks and overly populated tails of the
distribution (Jones et al. 2009).
Baumgartner and Jones (2010) brought Punctuated Equilibrium Theory to the
policy process from studies in physical sciences that describe earthquakes. Just as
small changes in the Earth’s plates eventually lead to massive earthquakes, small
un-addressed needs from policies eventually give way to massive changes. The small
changes build pressure within the system until they explode as one large change.
This theory has been supported in many different contexts of policy change from
incarceration rates (Schneider 2006) to election results (Baumgartner et al. 2009) and
to legislative actions (i.e. bill introductions and hearings). The most popular testing
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ground for this theory though has been budgetary changes (Jones, Baumgartner, and
True 1998; Robinson 2004; Baumgartner, Foucault, and Franc¸ois 2006; Breunig and
Koski 2006; Jordan 2003; Mortensen 2005; Breunig 2006; John and Margetts 2003;
Jones et al. 2009; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Robinson et al. 2007).
There are two leading theoretical explanations for PET. The first is dispropor-
tionate information processing (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Workman, Jones, and
Jochim 2009). This theory simply states that issues come in and out of policy at-
tention to citizens and officials. When they are salient, there will be more sizable
changes. When issues do not have the attention of policy-makers, they will see only
small, incremental changes. This pattern of over-responding and under-responding
is reflected in the shape of the leptokurtic distribution found so often among policy
changes.
The second reason is institutional friction. In short, the institutional processes to
translate policy inputs to policy outputs impose costs on the system. Institutional
barriers and veto points slow down and even impede the decision-making process.
This puts friction within the policy system. The friction will yield mostly incre-
mental changes, until the pressure builds up to burst into a large policy change, or
punctuation. In general, the more decision clearances, the more friction and the
more leptokurtic the distribution of changes will be.
Institutional friction has been measured in a variety of ways, including bureau-
cratization (broken down to centralization and organization size), stage in the policy
cycle, political system (presidential or parliamentary), executive dominance, single-
party governments, bicameralism, partisan control of government, partisan distance
of governing parties, and decentralization (Robinson et al. 2007; Robinson 2004;
Jones et al. 2009; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Breunig 2006). The presence of each
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of these features affects friction and the degree of kurtosis in the distribution of
budgetary changes.
While the empirical analyses in this literature could identify the overall pattern
of change, they were limited in how they accounted for punctuations as a dynamic
process. Using multivariate analysis to preserve the time-series cross-sectional na-
ture of the data, Robinson, Flink, and King (Forthcoming) test how the history of
experiencing a punctuation contributes to the probability of having a punctuation
in the future. The authors hypothesize two models of punctuations–the Error Ac-
cumulation and Institutional Models. The Error Accumulation Model states that a
history of a punctuation will lower the probability of experiencing a punctuation in
the future. In this model, punctuations occur to meet a pent up demand for change.
Once met, processes continue incrementally until the need for another large change.
The Institutional Model states that a history of a punctuation gives a higher proba-
bility that a punctuation will occur in the future. This model attributes punctuations
to poor organizational design and mismanagement that cannot find stability. Their
results support the Institutional Model–punctuations occur in clusters.
4.2.2 Budgetary Literature–The Connection Between Financial Resources and
Performance
In punctuated equilibrium studies, budgets are treated as an output. This is also
common among classic works in the budgeting literature (Davis, Dempster, and Wil-
davsky 1966, 1974; Wanat 1974). However, budgets are also inputs for the workings
of governments and organizations. There is a purpose to the dollar amount allo-
cated for specific programs–they are (generally) made with the intent of improving
or maintaining performance. Thus, only viewing budgets as an output series misses
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a crucial element to the study of the policy process–how resource volatility influences
core institutional functions.
It is largely unknown in the punctuated equilibrium literature how well bureau-
crats are able to hold their performance and efficiency despite disruptions to the
policy process–specifically disruptions in financial resources. Environmental shocks
happen all of the time–no person (let alone bureaucrat) is privileged to a completely
stable and predictable work environment. Bureaucrats must work the best they can
with more, less, or about the same amount of money available in their agency. Cit-
izens expect stable or improving levels of performance despite shrinking budgets.
Skilled organizations can maintain their work alongside these setbacks.
The connection between resources and organizational output is a crucial part
of the policy process and has direct implications for citizens. Theories of financial
resources’ impact on performance are based on the budgetary control hypothesis–
that budgets can be used as tools of political control (Carpenter 1996). It stipulates
that organizations and agencies will increase or decrease their work based on their
financial resources. The causal mechanism of this, however, was initially unclear–
was it truly the dollar amount altering actions or was it the signal sent by the
budgeting authorities through financial alterations? In his study of the Food and
Drug Administration and Federal Communications Commission, Carpenter (1996)
finds that the signal of budgetary changes is more important than the actual dollar
amount in altering agency productivity and output. In other words, the budget in
its actual dollar amount has limited impact on manipulating agency actions.
In public administration work, there is tension among literatures as to the effect of
resource changes on performance. While some scholars of public administration con-
tend that change and reform stimulate organizations to improve (Osborne and Plas-
trik 1997; O’Toole Jr and Meier 2003), others believe stability in resources will yield
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steady organization output gains (Weber 1946). Andersen and Mortensen (2010) ad-
dress this question of whether resource stability or change advances the organization.
By examining how budget stability impacts the absolute level of performance in pub-
lic education in the Danish school system, the authors find that budgetary stability
and incremental financial growth are the keys to high organizational performance.
Taking into account Andersen and Mortensen (2010), there has been limited work
as to how budget increases affect organizational performance. The general thought
is that increases to budgets will increase organization productivity and performance
(Boyne 2003; Carpenter 1996; Andersen and Mortensen 2010). This point, however,
is contested by other scholars that argue the added resources are absorbed by the
bureaucracy instead of being directed towards organizational output (Downs and
Corporation 1967; Niskanen 1971).
Aside from budget increases, a major focus of this work has been on how perfor-
mance fluctuates amidst budgetary cuts. Budget cuts are just one type of organi-
zational decline that has been studied throughout cutback management literature.
Faced with financial constraints, organizations will find it harder to adapt to new
demands, innovate to progress the organization, or retain personnel (Levine 1978).
Each of these components is necessary to improve organization outcomes.
Meier and OToole (2009) examine the affect of environmental shocks (in this
study, large decreases in a budget) in Texas school districts and examine how school
performance is affected on a variety of indicators. The authors find that performance
on the state wide standardized test is relatively unaffected by budget cuts. Other
performance indicators (Anglo test score results, percentage of students who took
ACT/SAT exams, and the percentage of students who scored above 1110 on SAT
or ACT equivalent) did see negative impacts from financial setbacks. The authors
contend that overall district performance is maintained by managerial choices on how
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to absorb the negative budget shock. In further analyses, they find that managers
protected the money allocated to instructional spending by buffering it from the
larger budgetary shocks. In other words, managers will choose to take proportionally
more funds from other programs to maintain current spending levels of instructional
expenditures.
Outside of the education context, federal agencies have been analyzed for how
they complete activities despite budgetary cuts. In their study of the EPA, Wood
and Waterman (1994) showed that monitoring and abatement activities were able to
recover from massive budget cuts and even eventually increase to the highest levels
in agency history. The agency was able to garner enough slack resources (beyond
more financial resources) to increase productivity.
4.3 Theory
In PET literature, there has been much work to understand the causes of the fric-
tion, but little to understand the consequences of friction on the provision of public
goods. How does friction in the policy process translate to organizational perfor-
mance? To use the earthquake metaphors–we know that the earthquake occurred.
What we don’t know is the aftermath of that earthquake. In the government and
organization context, we do not know how the presence of major policy shifts af-
fect the performance of governments. There must be consequences of “earthquakes”
in organizations. Earthquakes disrupt real life and have consequences for society.
How do massive policy changes impact public organizations’ ability to maintain core
performance?
The first part of this study examines the shape of the distribution of annual
percentage performance changes. This question ties directly to how policy process
friction translates to organization outputs. Literature that aims to explain organi-
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zational performance has found that performance is similar from one year to the
next–in other words it is autoregressive (O’Toole and Meier 1999). Given this, it is
expected that the distribution has a tall central peak of small changes, similar to a
leptokurtic distribution.
However, the distribution of performance changes could absorb some of the fric-
tion in budgetary alterations through implementation. Since performance is not
directly linked to the sources of friction from the policy process, it will not be as
punctuated. As explained above, one of the goals of management is to stabilize out-
put processes–this will result in fewer performance punctuations compared to the
budgetary process with more friction. This is also supported by budgetary litera-
ture outside of PET that has demonstrated how bureaucrats and managers work to
implement their desired level of performance despite budgetary changes.
This work also empirically tests how different magnitudes of budgetary changes
influence performance changes. There are five hypotheses based on different mag-
nitudes of budgetary changes. This categorization of budgetary changes has been
used throughout PET literature (Robinson et al. 2007; Robinson, Flink, and King
Forthcoming). As an extension to the literature, unique expectations for negative
and positive budgetary changes are specified 1. As is evident from the literature and
from theoretical ideas, negative and positive budgetary changes should yield different
reactions from managers and organizations. Theoretically, it is expected that man-
agers and organizations will dampen the effect of overly large input changes as they
translate to outputs. Thus, overly large budgetary changes should yield less dra-
matic performance alterations. Medium and incremental changes could more easily
be absorbed to the organization and not result in sizable performance changes.
1Thus far, the literature has only specified hypotheses based on the magnitude of the size of the
change, not the direction positive or negative.
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4.4 Hypotheses
This leads to the hypotheses:
H1: The distribution of annual percentage performance changes will be leptokurtic.
H2: The distribution of performance changes will have a lower kurtosis value than
the distribution of budgetary changes.
H3: Large negative budgetary changes will lead to smaller negative performance
changes.
H4: Medium negative budgetary changes will lead to incremental performance changes.
H5: Incremental budgetary changes will lead to incremental performance changes.
H6: Medium positive budgetary changes will lead to incremental performance changes.
H7: Large positive budgetary changes will lead to smaller positive performance changes.
4.5 Data and Methods
Data for this study come from Texas school districts from 1993 to 2010. This data
have been used in other studies of punctuated equilibrium (Robinson 2004; Robin-
son et al. 2007; Robinson, Flink, and King Forthcoming). Texas school districts all
have a similar organizational structure and policy environment. At their founda-
tion, though, they all share the same goal of educating students. This makes these
organizations comparable for empirical analyses. The data set contains budgetary,
student performance, and administrative information on hundreds of these organi-
zations (school districts). The timespan taken together with the large number of
organizations create a large enough dataset to test for the rare events (punctuations)
in this study.
The dependent variable for analyses is the annual percentage change in the school
district all student pass rate on the annual standardized test 2. This performance
2TAKS replaced TAAS in 2003.
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measure is one of the main focuses for schools. It has become one of the most salient
features of a district. Achieving high performance on this test can reward districts,
while poor performance can lead to negative consequences.
The budgetary measure for the independent variable is the annual percentage
change in instructional spending per student. This expenditure represents the core
function of schools–to educate students. This is the program budget that districts
will work to buffer from environmental shocks (Meier and OToole 2009). Thus, the
budgetary measure in this is an essential element to success in school districts. It is
also commonly analyzed as the budget of interest in other works in this literature
(Andersen and Mortensen 2010; Robinson et al. 2007; Robinson, Flink, and King
Forthcoming).
Both of these measures (budget change and performance change) will be used to
address Hypotheses 1 and 2. Simple tests on the normality and kurtosis value of
the distributions on each of these variables will assess the shape of the distributions.
This is the common empirical test throughout PET literature–the higher the kurtosis
value, the more friction is present in the policy system.
To analyze Hypotheses 3-7, the budgetary change variable is divided into five
categories based on the size of the budgetary change–positive and negative punc-
tuation, positive and negative medium size change, and incremental changes. This
is in accordance with the theoretical and empirical work in PET. The percentage
change threshold to divide the categories was determined using the method from
Robinson et al. (2007) in which a normal distribution is overlaid on the histogram
of budgetary changes. The four intersections between the histogram and normal dis-
tribution divide the budgetary variable into five categories. The percent boundaries
and frequencies for each category are shown in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Categories of budgetary changes.
Budget Change Category N Percent
Negative Punctuation (<-33) 125 0.67
Negative, Medium (-33 to -2) 2765 14.85
Incremental (-2 to 10) 12,674 68.05
Positive, Medium (10 to 35.5) 2871 15.41
Positive Punctuation (>35.5) 190 1.02
Distributions of performance changes for each of the five categories of budgetary
changes serve as initial analyses of Hypotheses 3 - 7. These five distributions give a
visual of how performance responds to different magnitudes of budgetary changes. It
is expected that the distributions for medium (positive and negative) and incremental
changes will have smaller performance changes than punctuated budgetary changes.
Lastly, regression analysis is conducted to examine Hypotheses 3-7. The depen-
dent variable is annual percentage performance change. There are four independent
variables of interest–dummy variables for each category of budgetary change (incre-
mental is the base category). Several control variables are included that are expected
to influence the standardized test pass rate. First, instructional spending per student
is added to the regression. The absolute level of funding–as opposed to changes–is
expected to influence performance. Typically, the more financial resources, the bet-
ter the performance. Teachers also affect student performance. Controls for teacher
experience (count variable of the number of years of experience) and teacher turnover
(percent of teachers in school who do not return the next school year) are added to
the regression. To assess the size of the district, student enrollment is included. Stu-
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dent attendance rate is added to the regression–students must attend class to learn
the material and do well on the standardized test. The percentage of funds spent
on central administration (and that value squared) is controlled for as a measure of
institutional structure. Lastly, a dummy variable for the year 2003 is added because
the standardized test changed from TAAS to TAKS in that year. The change of test
caused a decrease in test scores across all districts.
4.6 Results
4.6.1 Distribution of Performance Changes
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of annual percentage performance changes. This
figure supports Hypothesis 1. Since the kurtosis value is greater than 3 (the value
for a normal distribution) the distribution is leptokurtotic. This is also seen visually
in the histogram since it is greater in the central part and tails of the distribution
than the normal distribution. This means that friction is translated to performance
from the policy process.
Figure 4.2 lends support for Hypothesis 2–the distribution of performance changes
is much less kurtotic than the distribution of budgetary changes. The kurtosis value
for the distribution of budgetary changes is more than double the value of perfor-
mance changes. This finding indicates that there is much less friction in performance
outcomes than in budgetary decisions. Implementation absorbs part of the volatility
from budgeting decisions. In many ways, this is a positive outcome for the work of
public management. Managers are able to take a friction-filled process and create
less volatile outcomes–a desirable skill for the organization.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of performance changes.
Kurtosis = 8.68
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of budgetary changes.
Kurtosis = 18.32
4.6.2 Budgetary Changes Effect on Performance Changes–Distribution Analyses
The next set of empirical tests examines how different size budgetary changes
impact performance changes. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of annual percentage
performance changes by the category of budgetary change and Table 4.2 shows the
mean and standard deviation of each distribution. Even from these simple distri-
butions and descriptive statistics there are some surprising findings. Negative bud-
getary punctuations that are cuts greater than 33 % result in only a 1.34 % decrease
in performance. This shows great resiliency from management and the organization
to buffer a severe environmental shock. Positive punctuations (greater than 35.5 %
increase in spending per pupil) yields on average a 12 % increase in performance.
However, budgetary punctuations (positive and negative) lead to uncertainty in per-
formance changes as well–the standard deviation is quite large. Although the spread
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is wide in both distributions, there is a clustering of values around small incremental
changes.
The medium and incremental categories all produce positive average performance
changes and a clustering of observations around small incremental changes. Positive,
medium changes seem to produce the greatest performance gains. Negative, medium
changes (-2 to -33 %) are barely above zero. All three of these categories have
smaller standard deviations–the smaller changes seem to give a little more certainty
in performance. Taking together Figure 4.3 and Table 4.2, this gives preliminary
support for Hypotheses 3-7.
Figure 4.3: Distribution of performance changes by budgetary change category.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of performance change by budgetary change category.
Budget Change Category N Perf. Change Mean Std. Dev.
Negative Punctuation (<-33) 125 -1.34 35.73
Negative, Medium (-33 to -2) 2765 0.81 23.01
Incremental (-2 to 10) 12,674 3.18 20.36
Positive, Medium (10 to 35.5) 2871 14.29 31.42
Positive Punctuation (>35.5) 190 11.79 55.74
4.6.3 Budgetary Changes Effect on Performance Changes–Regression Analysis
Table 4.3 displays the results of the regression analysis. Of the four categories
of budgetary change, three are statistically significant. The occurrence of a pos-
itive budgetary punctuation is expected to improve performance almost 14 per-
cent compared to an incremental budgetary change. Medium positive budgetary
changes are expected to increase performance about 9 percent. Medium negative
budgetary changes, on the other hand, have a negative impact on performance com-
pared to an incremental budgetary change. Negative punctuations are not statisti-
cally significant–this means that it does not have a different affect on performance
changes than an incremental budgetary change. All of the control variables are
statistically significant as well.
Connecting these regression results to Hypotheses 3-7, there are mixed results for
whether the Hypotheses are supported or not. Hypotheses 3, 4, 5, and 7 all generally
find support. Hypothesis 6 finds limited support–medium positive changes actually
seem to increase performance greater than incrementally. Taken together, the find-
ings in this study show how management and organizations work to provide stable
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outcomes despite unstable inputs. However, they are also able to take advantage of
positive budgetary changes and improve organization outcomes. This is evident by
the sizable performance gains when budgets increase.
Table 4.3: The effects of budgetary changes on organizational performance changes.
Variable Model 1
Negative Budgetary Punctuation -3.77 (1.94)
Negative, Medium Budgetary Change -2.94** (0.43)
Positive, Medium Budgetary Change 9.21** (0.42)
Positive Budgetary Punctuation 13.79** (1.57)
Instruction Spending per Student -0.00** (0.00)
Teacher Experience -0.39** (0.10)
Teacher Turnover -0.15** (0.02)
District Enrollment (logged) -3.02** (0.91)
Attendance -1.04** (0.18)
Centralization -1.38** (0.11)
Centralization Squared 0.02** (0.00)
Year 2003 -57.63** (0.58)
Constant 146.39** (17.51)
Base Category is Incremental Budgetary Changes.
Standard Error in parentheses. Regression with fixed effects.
R2 = 0.37, N = 18625.
* = p¡0.05, ** = p¡0.01
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4.7 Conclusion
PET has focused on explaining the policy process through institutional and cogni-
tive factors. The literature has robustly demonstrated that policy changes are mostly
incremental, but also subject to large changes known as punctuations. What is miss-
ing from this literature is an understanding of the consequences of policy changes on
organization output. This is one of the contributions of this section–extending PET
to explain organization performance.
In the context of Texas school districts, this paper studies how budgetary changes
influence performance. One task of managers is to take the altering inputs of the
organization and translate them to smooth and consistent organization outputs. This
study supports this idea–the findings suggest that performance changes contain less
friction and a lower kurtosis value than budgetary changes and that the organization
can preserve performance despite negative budgetary shocks. These findings have
repercussions for organizations that are trying to keep stable performance amidst an
unstable financial environment.
There are a few notable limitations of this study. For one, the output studied
in this paper does not exactly conform to the budgetary control hypothesis. It is
unlikely that anyone wants the standardized test pass rate to decrease in any school
district. This study could be extended to other agencies that have work where
different “principals” have different expectations.
The regression model can also be extended to include other control variables that
can affect performance changes. There is a rich literature in public administration
and education literatures about school factors that influence the absolute level of
performance, but not performance changes. Thinking theoretically about what cause
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instability in outcomes can progress our understandings of how organizations can
sustain their work.
Future works can also examine how skilled bureaucracy or management can mit-
igate the affects of financial cutbacks on organizational outputs. This work calls for
an interaction between resources and organization personnel. Perhaps better trained
workers are able to maintain performance despite budgetary cuts or make greater
improvements with only small budget increases.
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5. CONCLUSION
5.1 Introduction
Fiscal concerns are part of every government and organization. Public agencies
need funds to provide goods and services to citizens. In addition, the stability of
those funds shapes how managers and workers within organizations approach their
jobs. One strand of budgetary literature explains the budgetary process. It not
only identifies an overall pattern of change, but examines organizational structures
that produce smaller or larger budgetary changes. Organizations need money to
complete their work for society and managers face hard decisions on how to allocate
those financial resources.
At the foundation of budgetary process literature, incrementalism states that
budgets will have small changes over time. This theory has been supported in many
different contexts over the decades of research. Embracing incrementalism, punctu-
ated equilibrium theory recognizes that budgetary changes will be mostly incremen-
tal. However, punctuated equilibrium also accounts for large, punctuated changes
that occur in the budgetary process (something incremental theory could not do).
This pattern of change (incremental and punctuated) has also been seen in many
different budgets from local, state, and federal governments.
These literatures are now progressing from simply identifying a pattern of change
(incremental and punctuated), to examining the organizational structures and other
features that contribute to more or less punctuations. Institutional decision-making
structures and cognitive limitations are the main theoretical reasons identified in PET
literature. This theoretical push is also coupled with improving empirical methods
in this literature. Thus far, univariate analyses have dominated the field. Scholars
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are now applying multivariate hypothesis testing to the study of budgetary changes.
These methods enhance our understanding of how multiple aspects of organizations
all influence budgetary decision-making.
The goal of this dissertation is to add to the knowledge of the public budgetary
process. Particularly, work for public administration literature is used to explain bud-
getary changes. This work can help inform public managers, organizations, agencies,
and officials about factors that influence budgetary stability and volatility and what
the consequences are for organization performance. Public organizations are part
of the everyday lives of citizens. A better understanding of their work can help to
improve outcomes for society.
The empirical analyses are performed using data from Texas school districts. This
data provide a good setting for empirically testing punctuated equilibrium theory.
For one, the data set is large enough to observe punctuations, which are rare events.
Also, this data consist of thousands of organizations with similar goals and policy
environment. Each district exercises control over their budgetary allocations as well.
This dissertation first, discusses all the ways budgetary changes are character-
ized by scholars. It also demonstrates how organizational features (standardize test
pass rate and personnel instability), influence budgetary changes on core activities
(instructional spending per student). Lastly, this dissertation examines the con-
sequences of budgetary changes on performance changes. A full discussion of key
contributions of this work is in the subsection below.
5.2 Review of Key Contributions
One of the key contributions of this dissertation is a synthesis of conceptual-
izations and measurement of budgetary changes. This literature has expanded in
breadth rather than in depth. As a consequence, it has missed a central under-
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standing or common language among scholars in the field as to what is and is not
incrementalism. Although it is unlikely that scholars will ever agree on one common
conceptualization of incrementalism, they can implement language into their work
to describe the type of change they are examining in their work.
In examination of the literature, there have been many types of incrementalism.
I consolidate these to four unique types: relative, procedural, mathematical, and
political incrementalisms. Relative incrementalism occurs when programs have the
same ranking (lowest to highest budgets) from one year to the next. If one program
surpasses another in the dollar amount allocated to it, relative non-incrementalism
occurs. Procedural incrementalism happens when the process to set the budget
stays the same from one year to the next. If there is a change in the process or
balance of decision-making among actors from one year to the next, procedural non-
incrementalism occurs. Both mathematical and political incrementalisms analyze
the annual change in budgets. If the budget changes are examined from zero, this is
mathematical incrementalism (if the change is close to zero). If the budget changes
are compared to the previous year’s budget change, this would be political incremen-
talism or non-incrementalism, depending on the size of the change.
Each of these typologies represent unique conceptualizations and measurement
schemes. Which method scholars use to characterize budgetary changes has reper-
cussions on what observations will be classified as incremental, non-incremental, and
punctuated changes. This will greatly impact the conclusions scholars draw from
their studies. Thus, when scholars try to compare their findings to published work,
the comparisons may not be appropriate. It depends if each researcher is examining
the same type of incrementalism.
Another contribution (particular to Section 3) is the theoretical development
of non-institutional friction (measured by district performance on the standardized
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test and teacher stability) as a catalyst for budgetary changes. It is commonly
known in public administration work that both performance and worker retention
are important objectives for managers. If any one of these components drop, it
puts stress into the organization. These theories, though, had not been tested in
punctuated equilibrium theory which states that friction and stress in an organization
will lead to more volatile policy (measured through the budget) changes.
As is common to the punctuated equilibrium literature, variable for annual per-
centage budgetary changes was split into five categories based on the magnitude
of the size of change–negative punctuation, medium negative, incremental, medium
positive, and positive punctuation. This was used as the dependent variable in multi-
nomial logit modeling. The budget analyzed was instructional spending per student.
This budget represents one of the core functions of school districts–educating stu-
dents in the classroom.
Controlling for a variety of variables identified in punctuated equilibrium lit-
erature (for example, institutional friction and organization history), performance
and personnel turnover (the measures of non-institutional friction) have statistically
significant affects on budgetary changes. The results indicate that as performance
increases, incremental changes become more prevalent. The is theoretically expected
because when the organization is performing well, there is little demand for change.
On the other side, when performance is low, fewer incremental changes are expected.
This means there is friction and demand for change in the organization.
Personnel instability also had statistically significant results for negative punctu-
ations and negative medium size changes. With regards to incremental changes, as
turnover increases there are fewer incremental changes. As personnel becomes more
stable, there is a greater probability for incremental changes. For public organiza-
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tions overall, this means that efforts to achieve high performance and retain workers
can see improvements in budgetary stability.
One of the most striking findings from Section 3 is the movement of probability
of medium size changes in the predicted probability graphs. PET has exclusively
focused on explaining punctuations. However, there is no statistically significant
effect across performance or personnel turnover of punctuations becoming more or
less probable. It seems they are equally likely to occur (at a very low probability)
across any amount of friction. Most of the action or trade off of incremental changes
comes from medium size changes. It is easier for budgetary actors to make medium
size changes than punctuated changes. More attention should be given to theorizing
about medium changes, since they do experience more alterations in probability
than punctuations. Given that punctuations do not occur very often and do not
have statistically discernible changes across the friction variables considered in this
dissertation, perhaps there is too much emphasis on explaining them within the
policy change literature.
Another important finding in Section 3 is the difference in the slope of the prob-
ability between positive and negative medium size budgetary changes. Literature
has focused on the magnitude of the change, not the direction. It was assumed both
positive and negative changes of the same magnitude occur with the same probabil-
ity. The graphs in Section 3 show how positive and negative changes behave very
differently–each have distinctive slopes across the predicted probabilities. In the
predicted probability graph on performance, medium positive changes have negative
slope while medium negative changes are relatively flat. In the graph for person-
nel turnover, medium negative changes have a positive slope and medium positive
changes have a negative slope.
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This is a clear indication that scholars need to theorize about the differences be-
tween positive and negative budgetary changes to better understand the budgetary
process. These type of changes are caused by unique factors in organizations. Also,
in a practical sense, an increasing versus decreasing budget have different implica-
tions for how management runs public organizations. Organizations with steadily
decreasing funds have to utilize cost-saving techniques or restrict their work. Or-
ganizations with increasing funds are better situated to expand and improve their
public services.
This leads to the key findings of Section 4–performance outcomes keep relatively
stable despite large budgetary changes. By studying the impact of the five categories
of budgetary changes on changes in organization performance, results indicate that
when the organization experienced a large budget cut, performance dropped only
a small amount. This speaks to the ability of managers and those in the organi-
zation to maintain their work with environmental turbulence. On the other end,
managers were able to capitalize on large budget increases and see immediate sizable
gains in performance. This means that management and the organization are able
to buffer the negative impacts of budgetary cuts and take advantage of budgetary
increases to advance their organization. These findings show great promise for orga-
nizations experiencing fiscal uncertainty–they can still maintain their performance
despite budget fluctuations.
5.3 Limitations, Improvements, and Extensions
While this dissertation moves the understanding of budgetary processes forward,
there are limitations to these findings. For one, causality is still questionable. While
Section 3 demonstrated how performance (lagged) influences budgetary changes,
Section 4 examined how budgetary changes influence performance. Using granger
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causality tests on data with many groups has theoretical limitations. In this case,
there are over 1000 school districts studied. Perhaps some school districts have the
causal arrow going one way, while many other school districts have the causal arrow
pointing the other way. It is difficult to really assess causality in this case. The causal-
ity tests conducted indicated statistical significance in both directions. Perhaps the
next step in understanding what factors influence budgetary decision-making, inter-
views with superintendents and school board members would be appropriate. Within
the budgetary literature, scholars have recently acknowledged this qualitative short-
coming.Talking with public officials can shed some light on how budgetary decisions
are made.
PET is referred to as a class or group theory in that hypotheses are about the
magnitude of a change as either incremental or punctuated. In empirical work,
though, this grouping masks variation and limits theoretical development. This vari-
ation can lead to deeper understandings of the budgetary process. However, moving
PET away from this grouping takes away the basic principles at the foundation of
the theory. Although it has been advocated for PET to progress beyond “arbitrary”
thresholds, it is unclear how punctuated equilibrium theory would exist without a
defined category of punctuations.
This work could be improved by adding more to or examining other variables
in the empirical models. The budget of interest in this dissertation is the core
function for these organizations–instructional spending per student. However, how
would institutional and non-institutional friction affect funds directed for minority
groups? In the education setting, how do bilingual education funds fit into the PET
framework? It would be expected for these funds to have larger fluctuations since
in many districts, this is not a top priority for expenditures. This would vary by
the number of bilingual student in a district. Does a greater number of students
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who demand this services lead to less fluctuations? Will managers work to stabilize
the funds for these minority issues? This is a question that can be addressed in the
Texas schools data set.
Future research can also examine the hierarchical aspects of the budgeting process
on budgetary changes. Do changes in the federal level trickle down to changes in
the state and local levels? Or how does friction at the state or federal level effect
incremental and punctuated changes at the local level? It is theorized that less
punctuations occur as the level of hierarchy increases. Does this empirically hold
true?
This study would benefit by being applied to other public organizations and
policy domains outside of the education setting. While the data in Texas school
districts provide a nice context for this dissertation, the results could be unique to
the education arena. Testing these theories in other public policy areas (for example,
health) would lead to a better understanding of the budgeting process in different
policy fields.
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